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Abstract. The application and analysis of the Cut-and-Choose technique in protocols secure against
quantum adversaries is not a straightforward transposition of the classical case, among other reasons
due to the difficulty to use “rewinding” in the quantum realm. We introduce a Quantum Computation
Cut-and-Choose (QC-CC) technique which is a generalisation of the classical Cut-and-Choose in order
to build quantum protocols secure against quantum covert adversaries. Such adversaries can essentially
deviate arbitrarily provided that their deviation is not detected with high probability. As an application
of the QC-CC technique we give a protocol for securely performing a two-party quantum computation
with classical input and output. As a basis we use the concept of secure delegated quantum computing
[4], and in particular the protocol for quantum garbled circuit computation of [16] that has been proven
secure against only a weak specious adversaries (defined in [8]). A unique property of these protocols is
the separation between classical and quantum communications and the asymmetry between client and
server, which enables us to sidestep the issues linked to quantum rewinding. This opens the possibility
of applying the QC-CC technique to other quantum protocols that have this separation. In our proof of
security we adapt and use (at different parts of the proof) two quantum rewinding techniques, namely
Watrous’ oblivious quantum rewinding [27] and Unruh’s special quantum rewinding [26]. Our protocol
achieves the same functionality as in the previous work on secure two-party quantum computing such
as the one in [9], however using the Cut-and-Choose technique on the protocol from [16] leads to the
following key improvements: (i) only one-way offline quantum communication is necessary , (ii) only
one party (server) needs to have involved quantum technological abilities, (iii) only minimal extra
cryptographic primitives are required, namely one oblivious transfer for each input bit and quantum-
safe commitments.
1 Introduction
A key task in modern cryptography is to compute a function of many inputs given by different
parties that do not trust each other and wish to maintain the privacy of their input. This is called
secure multi-party computation (to name some examples: millionaire’s problem, coin tossing, voting
schemes, etc). The field started with the seminal paper of Yao [28], where two-parties that do not
trust each other (they are “honest-but-curious”) compute a function of their joint inputs. This
protocol was later made secure against malicious adversaries by employing standard (classical)
techniques for boosting the security of honest-but-curious protocols to the malicious adversarial
setting (e.g. using the GMW compiler as in [12]). Another such technique is the Cut-and-Choose
technique first used in this context in [20].
The quantum analogue (secure two-party quantum computation, or 2PQC) involves the com-
putation of a function using a quantum computer and was first examined in [8] for a quantum
honest-but-curious adversaries (called specious) and later made secure against more malicious ad-
versaries in [9]. The latter protocol, did not use any of the standard boosting classical techniques,
but instead used a stepwise quantum authentication protocol, where two-ways online quantum
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communication was required. Moreover, both protocols use extra classical cryptographic primi-
tives, which in the case of the malicious [9] is a full actively secure classical two-party computation
primitive.
The use of classical boosting techniques (such as Cut-and-Choose) for quantum protocols is
complicated not only because specific care is needed when defining quantum analogues, for example,
for garbled circuits but also for technical reasons since the rewinding method for proving security
cannot be directly used in quantum protocols (as demonstrated for zero knowledge proofs [27] and
zero knowledge proofs of knowledge [26]).
Our Contribution
1. We introduce a Quantum Computation Cut-and-Choose technique. Application of this technique
is made possible because of the unique decomposition of quantum computation into a classical
control and a quantum resource in the measurement-based quantum computing models such as
gate teleportation. This separation furthermore provides a platform for a client-server setting
for secure delegated computing [4].
2. We give a protocol for 2PQC with classical input and output1 which is secure against “quantum
covert” adversaries, a notion of strong adversaries similar with the classical covert adversaries [1]
(see below for formal definition and motivation). We use the aforementioned QC-CC technique
and address the subtleties in the security proof due to rewinding. Our protocol, which builds
on the work of [16] that gave a protocol for 2PQC secure against weak specious adversaries,
resembles the original protocol by Yao [28] (e.g. asymmetry between the two parties) and in
particular the one in [20], where Yao’s protocol is boosted to the malicious case using the
classical Cut-and-Choose technique.
3. A key obstruction when using classical techniques for boosting the security of quantum protocols
is that in general rewinding the quantum adversary during the simulation is not possible. There
are two known cases where rewinding can be used for quantum adversaries, namely Watrous’
oblivious rewinding [27] and Unruh’s special rewinding [26]. We adapt and use both methods in
different places in order to construct the simulators and prove the security of our protocol. This
is one of the few protocols in which quantum rewinding is explicitly used and the only one, to
our knowledge, that uses two types of quantum rewinding.
4. [9,8] describe 2PQC protocols in a setting where the two parties are symmetric. Our protocol
crucially differs in a number of points (other than using the Cut-and-Choose technique): (i)
There is only one-way offline quantum communication between the parties, (ii) only one party
(“server”) needs involved quantum technological abilities, while the other (“client”) only needs
to prepare offline single qubits, (iii) minimal classical cryptographic primitives are required,
namely oblivious transfer for input bits and quantum-safe commitments.
In Section 2 we present background material and introduce the notion of quantum covert adversaries
(similarly with [1]). In Section 3 we introduce the quantum-computation Cut-and-Choose technique.
In Section 4 we give the protocol for 2PQC and prove its security in Appendix D.
1 Note, that even though we evaluate a classical function we still need quantum computation if this function cannot
be efficiently computed (in the honest case) with a classical computer (e.g. functions that involve factoring) and
thus classical techniques are not applicable.
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Related works. The field of secure two (and multi) party (classical) computation started with
Yao’s paper [28], which was proven secure against malicious adversaries in [12] using generic Zero-
Knowledge proofs and in [20] with the Cut-and-Choose technique. Covert adversaries were intro-
duced in [1] where again the Cut-and-Choose technique was used to achieve an even more efficient
protocol. Yao’s protocol has been used for a number of other functionalities, such as constructing
non-interactive verifiable computing [11].
In the early days of quantum computation, researchers believed that quantum properties could
lead to a breakthrough and achieve, with unconditional security, several (clasical) multi-party cryp-
tographic primitives. However a series of no-go theorems, first proving that bit commitment is
impossible [22,23] , then oblivious transfer [21] and finally [25] showed that any non-trivial func-
tionality leaks some information to adversaries. Since then, it is established that any such protocol
is either only computationally secure or requires the existence of certain (quantum secure) simple
cryptographic primitives.
Closely related is the question of what assumptions are required if one wants to perform a
secure quantum computation involving multiple parties. The case of 2PQC was addressed in [8] for
quantum honest-but-curious and in [9] for malicious adversaries. The case of multiple parties was
addressed in [2,5] where an honest majority was required.
In this work we use as basis the universal blind quantum computation protocol [4] and its
verifiable version [10]. For the case of weak specious adversaries, the 2PQC was addressed in [16]
while the multiparty quantum computation was also addressed in [15], again in a restricted setting.
While we use measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC) [24], similar blind and verification
protocols exist in the teleportation model [3] and 2PQC or MPQC protocols could be explored for
that case as well as other blind verification protocols such as [13].
2 Preliminaries and Security Definitions
2.1 Verifiable Blind Quantum Computation
The model for quantum computations used in our contribution is MBQC [24]. In this section we
introduce MBQC and revise protocols for blind quantum computation (server performs computation
without learning input/output or computation) [4] and verifiable blind quantum computation (client
can also verify that the computation was performed correctly) [10] which are based on it.
The MBQC model of computation is equivalent to the circuit model as it is based on the
gate teleportation principle. One starts with a large, generic entangled state (represented by a
graph) and, by choosing suitable single qubit measurements, can perform any quantum computation
(circuit). The computation is fully characterised by the graph and default measurement angles (see
below) and is called a measurement pattern. See an example of a universal set of gates expressed
as MBQC measurement patterns in Appendix A.
For our purpose it will be simpler to consider a client-server setting. The client can prepare
single qubits while the server can perform any general quantum computation. The client prepares
and sends qubits in the |+〉 state and the server entangles them according to a certain computation
graph by performing controlled−Z gates between all qubits corresponding to adjacent vertices on
the graph, resulting in a graph state (details can be found in [14]). The computation is defined by
a default measurement angle φi (which depends only on the desired computation). It is carried out
by having the server measure single qubits in an order defined by the flow. The actual angle of
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each measurement depends on φi and on the outcomes of previous measurements. In our setting,
the client is responsible for these classical calculations to adjust the angle and therefore the server
returns to the client the result of each measurement, for more details see [4].
Let I and O be respectively the sets of input and output qubits. A flow is defined by a function
(f : Oc → Ic) from measured qubits to non-input qubits and a partial order () over the vertices
of the graph such that ∀i, i  f(i) and ∀j ∈ NG(i), f(i)  j, where NG(i) denotes the neighbours
of i in graph G. Each qubit i is X-dependent on Xi = f
−1(i) and Z-dependent on all qubits j
such that i ∈ NG(j) (this set is called Zi). The existence of such a flow in all the graphs used
for computations in MBQC patterns guarantees that the number of dependencies does not blow
up. Given the sets Xi and Zi the computation angle for qubit i needs to be adjusted as such :
let sXi = ⊕j∈DXi sj and s
Z
i = ⊕j∈DZi sj , where sj corresponds to the outcome of the measurement
on qubit j and DXi and D
Z
i are subsets of Xi and Zi respectively (these qubits in D
X
i and D
Z
i
have all already been measured as they belong to the past neighbours and past neighbours of past
neighbours, see the flow construction in [6]). Then the corrected angle (the one that is actually
measured) is φ′i = (−1)s
X
i φi + s
Z
i pi.
The computation can be totally hidden from the server due to the following observation: if
instead of sending |+〉 states the client chooses at random and sends |+θ〉 = 1/
√
2(|0〉 + eiθ |1〉)
with θ ∈ {0, pi/8, 2 · pi/8, . . . , 7 · pi/8} then measuring the qubits in a similarly rotated basis has the
same result as the initial non-rotated computation. If the client keeps the angle θ hidden from the
server, the server is completely blind on what computation is being performed. To ensure that no
information is leaked from the measurement outcome, we add another parameter ri for each qubit,
which serves as a One-Time-Pad for the measurement outcome. The resulting measurement angle
with all parameters taken into account is then δi = C(φi, s
X
i , s
Z
i , θi, ri) = φ
′
i(φi, s
X
i , s
Z
i ) + θi + ripi.
In short, the client sends rotated qubits (to become the resource state once entangled) and then
guides the computation with a set of classical instructions. It is the combination of these two parts
(quantum state preparation and classical instructions) that leads to the desired blind computation.
This idea was formalised in the universal blind quantum computation (UBQC) protocol in [4].
We denote rani collectively all the parameters that δi depends on other than φi. We use bold
and suppress the subscript that refers to a particular qubit in the graph to denote a full string, e.g.
φ := {φ1, · · · , φN}, ran = {ran1, · · · , ranN}. We then define the past of qubits, which allows us to
calculate upper bounds on the number of dependencies for various computation graphs.
Definition 1 (Past of qubit i and Influence-past of qubit i). We define Pi = Zi ∪Xi to be
the set of qubits j that have X or Z dependency on i. We define influence-past ci of qubit i to be
an assignment of an outcome bj ∈ {0, 1} for all qubits j ∈ Pi.
For example the brickwork state [4], which can be used for universal quantum computation,
has for each qubit a single X-dependent qubit and at most two Z-dependent qubits, and so the
cardinality |Pi| is at most 3 for all i. To each influence-past ci corresponds a unique value of δi
(the corrected measurement angle for this influence-past). Note that we will denote δ the set of
instructions that include the measurement angles of each qubit, for all alternative influence-pasts,
i.e. this is not a string of N measurement angles δi but of
∑N
i=1 |Pi| measurement angles of the
form δi(ci), where we have |Pi| angles per qubit.
In UBQC, the server is not forced to follow the instructions and the client cannot verify if
the computation is done correctly. One can modify the protocol to allow for such verification (see
Theorem 1), as was first done in [10]. The central idea is to include trap qubits at positions unknown
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to the server. The client can send states from {|0〉 , |1〉} (called dummies), which have the effect
of breaking the graph at this vertex, removing it along with any attached edges. This can be
used to generate isolated qubits in the graph in a way that is undetectable by the server. These
isolated qubits do not affect the computation while they have deterministic outcome if measured
in the correct basis. They can therefore be used as traps: a client can easily detect if one of them
has been measured incorrectly but the server is ignorant of their position in the graph. This idea
was introduced in [10] and later optimised by different protocols, such as [17] which we use here.
The reason to use [17], other than efficiency, is because the construction is “local” and the server
can obtain some information about the true graph (needed for 2PQC) without compromising the
security. The construction of the resource given a base-graph G (graph that the UBQC computation
without traps requires), that has vertices v ∈ V (G) and edges e ∈ E(G), is the following:
1. For each vertex vi, we define a set of three new vertices Pvi = {pvi1 , pvi3 , pvi3 }. These are called
primary vertices.
2. Corresponding to each edge e(vi, vj) ∈ E(G) of the base-graph that connects the base vertices
vi and vj , we introduce a set of nine edges Ee(vi,vj) that connect each of the vertices in the set
Pvi with each of the vertices in the set Pvj .
3. We replace every edge in the resulting graph with a new vertex connected to the two vertices
originally joined by that edge. The new vertices added in this step are called added vertices.
This is the dotted triple-graph DT (G).
The edge or vertex of the initial graph that each vertex v ∈ DT (G) belongs to is called its
base-location. We can see that by inserting dummy qubits among the added qubits we can break
the DT (G) in three copies of the same base-graph: one will be used for the computation while the
other two can be used as traps. Furthermore for each vertex base-location the choice of where to
break the graph is independent from other vertex base-locations and can be made in advance by
the client. The server remains totally ignorant of this choice. This choice is called trap-colouring.
Definition 2 (Trap-Colouring, taken from [17]). We define trap-colouring to be an assignment
of one colour to each of the vertices of the dotted triple-graph that is consistent with the following
conditions:
1. Primary vertices are coloured in one of the three following colours: white or black (for traps),
or green (for computation).
2. Added vertices are coloured in one of the four following colours: white, black, green or red.
3. In each primary set Pv there is exactly one vertex of each colour.
4. Colouring the primary vertices fixes the colours of the added vertices: added vertices that connect
primary vertices of different colour are red, added vertices that connect primary vertices of the
same colour get that colour.
The flow, Past of qubit i and Influence-past of qubit i can all be extended to the Dotted-Triple-
Graph construction, with the result that each qubit still depends on a constant number of previous
measurements (see [17]).
For completeness we give the verification protocol from [17] that we use:
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Fig. 1. Dotted-triple-graph for one-dimensional base graph of four qubits. Circles: primary vertices (base-location :
vertex of the base-graph); Squares: added vertices (base-location : edge of the base-graph). (a) Trap-colouring. Green:
computation qubits; White/black: trap qubits; Red: dummy qubits. Client chooses the trap-colouring, prepares each
qubit individually and sends them one by one for the server to entangle according to the generic construction. (b)
After entangling, the breaking operation defined by the dummy qubits will reduce the graph in (a) to the computation
graph and for each vertex a corresponding trap/tag qubits.
Protocol 1 Verifiable Universal Blind Quantum Computation using dotted triple-graph (with
Fault-tolerant Encoding) - Taken from [17]
We assume that a standard labeling of the vertices of the dotted triple-graph DT (G) is known to both the client and
the server. The number of qubits is at most 3N(3c+ 1) where c is the maximum degree of the base graph G.
• Client’s resources
– Client is given a base graph G. The corresponding dotted graph state |D(G)〉 is generated by graph D(G) that is
obtained from G by replacing every edge with a new vertex connected to the two vertices originally joined by that
edge.
– Client is given an MBQC measurement pattern IMComp which when applied to the dotted graph state |D(G)〉
performs the desired computation, in a fault-tolerant way that can detect or correct errors fewer than δ/2.
– Client generates the dotted triple-graph DT (G) and selects a trap-colouring according to definition 2, which is done
by choosing independently the colours for each set Pv.
– Client for all red vertices will send dummy qubits and thus perform break operation.
– Client chooses the green graph to perform the computation.
– Client for the white graph will send dummy qubits for all added qubits aew and thus generate white isolated qubits
at each primary vertex set Pv. Similarly for the black graph the client will send dummy qubits for the primary qubits
pvb and thus generate black isolated qubits at each added vertex set Ae.
– The set D of the positions of dummy qubits is chosen as defined above (fixed by the trap-colouring).
– A binary string s of length at most 3N(3c+ 1) represents the measurement outcomes. It is initially set to all zeros.
– A sequence of measurement angles, φ = (φi)1≤i≤3N(3c+1) with φi ∈ A = {0, pi/4, · · · , 7pi/4}, consistent with IMComp.
We define φ′i(φi, s) to be the measurement angle in MBQC, when corrections due to previous measurement outcomes
s are taken into account (the function depends on the specific base-graph and its flow, see e.g. [4]). We also set φ′i = 0
for all the trap and dummy qubits. – The Client chooses a measurement order on the dotted base-graph D(G) that
is consistent with the flow of the computation (this is known to the Server). The measurements within each set Pv
and Ae of DT (G) are ordered randomly.
– 3N(3c+ 1) random variables θi with values taken uniformly at random from A.
– 3N(3c+ 1) random variables ri and |D| random variable di with values taken uniformly at random from {0, 1}.
– A fixed function C(i, φi, θi, ri, s) = φ
′
i(φi, s) + θi + ripi that for each non-output qubit i computes the angle of the
measurement of qubit i to be sent to the Server.
(Continues on next page)
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Protocol 2 continuing: VUBQC with DT(G)
• Initial Step
– Client’s move: Client sets all the value in s to be 0 and prepares the input qubits:
|e〉 = Xx1Z(θ1)⊗ . . .⊗XxlZ(θl) |I〉
and the remaining qubits in the following form
∀i ∈ D |di〉
∀i 6∈ D ∏j∈NG(i)∩D Zdj |+θi〉
and sends the Server all the 3N(3c+ 1) qubits in the order of the labelling of the graph.
– Server’s move: Server receives 3N(3c+ 1) single qubits and entangles them according to DT (G).
• Step i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3N(3c+ 1)
– Client’s move: Client computes the angle δi = C(i, φi, θi, ri, s) and sends it to the Server.
– Server’s move: Server measures qubit i with angle δi and sends the result bi to the Client.
– Client’s move: Client sets the value of si in s to be bi + ri.
• Final Step:
– Server’s move: Server returns the last layer of qubits (output layer) to the Client.
• Verification
– After obtaining the output qubits from the Server, the Client measures the output trap qubits with angle δt = θt+rtpi
to obtain bt.
– Client accepts if bi = ri for all the white (primary) and black (added) trap qubits i.
– Client applies corrections according to measurement outcomes bi and secret parameters θi, ri at the output layer
green qubits and obtains the final output.
Theorem 1 (Verifiability of VUBQC, taken from [17]). Protocol 1 is 2-verifiable for the
Client, where 2 =
(
8
9
)d
for d =
⌈
δ
2(2c+1)
⌉
. 2-verifiability means that for any strategy of the server
the real state is 2-close (in trace distance) to ρideal(ρin, pok) for some 0 ≤ pok ≤ 1 where ρin is the
initial state and ρf := U(ρin) is the desired final state:
ρideal(ρin, pok) := pokρf + (1− pok)([abort1])
2.2 Standard Definitions of Security for Quantum Two-Party Computations
Following [8], we have two parties A and B with quantum registers A and B and extra register R,
where dimR = (dimA+ dimB). The input is denoted ρin ∈ D(A⊗B ⊗R), where D(A) is the set
of all possible quantum states in register A. Let then L(A) be the set of linear mappings from A
to itself and let φ : L(A)→ L(B) be a completely positive and trace preserving superoperator, also
called quantum operation. Finally let 1lA be the totally mixed state and 1A be identity operator in
register A. We will write U ·ρ instead of UρU † and we will sometimes denote [b] := |b〉〈b|. Let Uf be
the unitary which when applied to classical inputs (computational basis) (x, y), returns the classical
output f(x, y) = (f1(x, y), f2(x, y)). The ideal output is ρout = (Uf ⊗ 1l) · ρin. Given two states ρ0
and ρ1, the trace norm distance is ∆(ρ0, ρ1) :=
1
2‖ρ0 − ρ1‖. When ∆(ρ0, ρ1) ≤  then any process
applied to ρ0 behaves the same as it would on ρ1 except with probability at most . A function µ
is negligible in n if, for every polynomial p, for sufficiently large n’s it holds that µ(n) < 1p(n) .
All the proofs of security in this paper will be in the real/ideal simulation paradigm: when con-
sidering a party as corrupted, we will construct a simulator interacting with the ideal functionality
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such that they are not able to detect that they are not in fact interacting directly with a real world
honest party instead.
The standard definition of security means that the simulated and real states are exponentially
close and so indistinguishable for the adversary.
Definition 3 (Privacy). We say that the n-step two party strategy is -private for B if there
exists (n) negligible in n such that for all adversaries A˜ and for all steps i we have:
∆
(
vi(A˜, ρin),TrBi
(
ρ˜i(A˜, ρin)
))
≤ (n) (1)
where vi(A˜, ρin) is the view of the adversary when interacting with the simulator and TrBi
(
ρ˜i(A˜, ρin)
)
is the view of the adversary in the real protocol.
For further details on these definitions, see [8].
Another property which a quantum protocol may satisfy is verifiability. This intuitively means
that the probability of receiving a corrupted output without aborting is negligible.
Definition 4 (-verifiability). A protocol is said to be -verifiable for party Pi if for any (poten-
tially malicious) behaviour of party Pj with j 6= i, the probability of obtaining a wrong output and
not aborting is bounded by . If the output of the real protocol with malicious party P˜j is ρ˜(P˜j , ρin)
then we have that:
∆(ρ˜(P˜j , ρin), ρideal(ρ
′
in)) ≤  (2)
where
ρideal(ρin) := pok(1lHPi ⊗ CHPj ) · Uf · (ρin) + (1− pok)([abort1])
where CHPj is the deviation that acts on Pj’s systems after they receive their outcome (a CP-map,
it can be purified by including ancilla), ρ′in = (1lHPi ⊗ DHPj )ρin is an initial state compatible with
Pi’s input, where DHPj is a deviation on the input by Pj.
Note that since CHPj is performed at the final step of the protocol, we also have that the global
state (before the final step deviation, i.e. at step n− 1) follows:
∆(ρ˜n−1(P˜j , ρin), ρn−1ideal(ρ
′
in)) ≤  (3)
where ρn−1ideal(ρin) := pokUf · (ρin) + (1− pok)([abort1])
During our protocol we will use bit commitment and 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (or OT).
Bit commitment consists of two phases, Commit and Reveal, such that after the Commit the
receiver has no information about the value that has been committed (hiding), while during the
Reveal the sender cannot reveal a value different from the one committed previously (binding). Both
these properties can be either computationally or unconditionally verified depending on the scheme
(but not both unconditionally). We suppose that all the commitments used verify the following
strict binding property.
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Definition 5 (Strict binding, taken from [26]). Let COM be a commitment scheme, a de-
terministic polynomial-time function taking two arguments: the opening information a and the
message y. We say COM is strictly binding if for all a, y, a′, y′ with (a, y) 6= (a′, y′), we have
that COM(a, y) 6= COM(a′, y′). It means that the sender is committed to the (unique) opening
information and the message that is being committed.
A 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer is a two party functionality in which one party (P1 in our case)
has two strings (x0, x1) and the other (P2) has a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. At the end of the protocol P2
recovers xb. P1 should not know which of the strings P2 has chosen while P2 has no information
about the string they did not choose x1−b.
The following coin-tossing protocol will be needed later:
Protocol 3 Coin-Tossing Protocol
1. P1 chooses α1
R∈ {0, 1}log(s) uniformly at random, commits to it and sends the commitment to P2 (this commit-
ment has to be perfectly hiding).
2. P2 chooses α2
R∈ {0, 1}log(s) uniformly at random and sends it to P1.
3. P1 opens their commitment and reveals α1.
4. They both set α = α1 ⊕ α2, where ⊕ corresponds to the bitwise XOR (α is the index of the evaluation graph).
2.3 Quantum Covert Adversaries
We now introduce a new adversarial model for quantum protocols, based on the covert adversaries
in [1]. The quantum covert adversaries are also able to deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. The
main difference with malicious is that when they cheat they are caught with high probability but
not necessarily exponentially close to 1.
This models real world situations where getting caught might have dire consequences for the
parties, eg. financial repercussions. By associating the correct cost to being caught, even if the
probability of getting caught is not exponentially close to 1 the deterrence might be still high
enough to make cheating unappealing.
Definition 6 (Privacy against covert adversaries). We say that the protocol is -private for
B if for all adversaries A˜ and for all steps i we have:
∆
(
vi(A˜, ρin),TrBi
(
ρ˜i(A˜, ρin)
))
≤  (4)
Note that we do not have any requirement on  and so, while we would like it to be close to 0 it
does not necessarily need to be negligible.
Stronger and more elegant definitions of covert adversaries that might be adaptable to the
quantum case can be found in [1], but for reasons specific to our construction (namely the fact that
measurement is irreversible and disturbs quantum states) they are not directly applicable here.
Relation with specious and malicious adversaries In the classical case the covert adversary lies
between the honest-but-curious and malicious ones for some choices of , as shown in [1]. Their
analysis partially holds also for the quantum case: the quantum covert adversary is strictly less
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powerful than the fully malicious adversary, unless the  is negligible, in which case both notions
are trivially equivalent. The situation is not as clear with quantum specious adversaries. We only
get that if the protocol is secure against covert adversaries with a certain  then it is also secure
against specious adversaries with the same , which is not required to be negligible.
3 The Quantum Cut-and-Choose Technique
The Cut-and-Choose method is a standard technique to boost a protocol secure against honest-but-
curious to being secure against malicious adversaries, by enforcing the honest-but-curious behaviour.
The classical Yao protocol, which also relies on a client/server (or garbler/evaluator) setup, was
first proven secure against honest-but-curious adversaries (e.g. in [19]) and then against malicious
adversaries using this technique in [20].
The garbler creates s copies of the graph and the evaluator chooses which ones (the check
graphs) they will check for consistency. If the checks pass and additional precautions are taken,
the evaluator is confident that with high probability the remaining graphs (the evaluation graphs)
were also constructed correctly and can be used for the computation. Here we will have s graphs
in total, s − 1 check graphs and 1 evaluation graph. In the classical Yao protocol, the probability
of cheating and not getting caught is made negligible by using s2 check graphs and
s
2 evaluation
graphs and revealing only the majority output of the evaluation graphs (not possible in quantum
case, see below). There are several caveats in this setting even classically, cf. [20,18].
We extend this technique to quantum computations in three steps. First, we show how to verify
quantum states using Quantum-State-Preparation Cut-and-Choose (QSP-CC). This ensures that
the resource state for the quantum computation in VBQC is constructed correctly. Secondly, we
define Classical Instructions Cut-and-Choose (CI-CC), using the classical Cut-and-Choose to verify
that the (classical) instructions for the computation are correct. Finally, we combine the two to get
Quantum Computation Cut-and-Choose (QC-CC).
3.1 Quantum State Preparation Cut-and-Choose (QSP-CC)
The intuition for this functionality is that it allows the receiver to essentially test that a state
|ψα〉 was prepared and sent correctly (as promised), up to a certain probability, without the sender
revealing the classical description of that state. This procedure boosts the classical commitment
scheme towards a quantum-state commitment. Note however, that a proper quantum-state com-
mitment scheme would require that the receiver also obtains no information about the state, which
is not true here: in the above scheme the receivers can always obtain some (partial) information by
measuring the state.
See Protocol 4 (below) for details and Appendix B for proof that the state is 1√
s
-close to the
correctly-prepared. Note that if we used more than 1 evaluation graphs (as needed for boosting
the success probability), the probability of successful cheating does not scale linearly with parallel
repetitions of QSP-CC due to coherent (entangled) attacks.
3.2 Classical Instructions Cut-and-Choose (CI-CC)
To perform the VBQC protocol, even if the resource state is correct, one needs to ensure that
the classical instructions, i.e. measurement angles for each qubit δ(φ, ran), are also correct. The
subscripts to bold symbols denote different graphs.
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Protocol 4 Functionality: QSP-CC
Set up: Two parties Alice and Bob.
Input: Alice inputs a set of s pure states {|ψ1〉 , · · · , |ψs〉} along with their classical descriptions ψi. Bob chooses one
index α at random.
Output: For any strategy of an adversarial Alice, there exists a 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 such that Bob obtains a state 1√
s
-close to
ρid(p) := p |ψα〉〈ψα|+ (1− p)[Abort].
Protocol:
– Alice commits the classical values ψi with quantum-safe classical commitment scheme.
– Alice sends all the s labelled quantum states and then the s commitments to Bob.
– Bob randomly chooses the index α and request to open all commitments for i 6= α.
– Alice reveals all the classical values ψi for i 6= α.
– Bob measures all states with index i 6= α in the basis {Pi := |ψi〉〈ψi| , P¯i := I − |ψi〉〈ψi|} and aborts if he obtains
the second outcome for any measurement. If the states |ψi〉 are tensor products of qubits, as is the case for the states
sent by the verifier in VBQC, this measurement can be performed with local single qubit measurements.
– The state |ψα〉 (not measured) is guaranteed to be 1√s -close to ρid(p) for some p.
The angles φ are public, the receiver wants to ensure that (δα, ranα), for the evaluation graph
α, is correct (and committed) without learning ranα. To achieve this, the sender commits to the
classical instructions for all graphs δi after sending the (correct) qubits |ψi(rani)〉 to the receiver.
When rani is opened, the receiver can deterministically decide if δi is correct (w.r.t. φ). Intuitively
we expect that such a classical Cut-and-Choose has a 1s probability of failure but it turns out that
it is in fact 1√
s
, due to the specific proof techniques used to prove security against a quantum
adversary and in particular the special rewinding from Appendix C.2. This will become clear in the
proof of the following section.
Protocol 5 Functionality: CI-CC
Set up: Two parties Alice and Bob.
Input: Alice inputs a set of s pure states {|ψ1(ran1)〉 , · · · , |ψs(rans)〉} and for each state a set of classical instructions
{δ1, · · · , δs} and the underlying randomness {ran1, · · · , rans}. Bob chooses one index α at random.
Output: For any strategy of an adversarial Alice involving only the classical instructions, the probability that Bob
receives the wrong instructions δα for |ψα(ranα〉 and does not abort is at most 1√s .
Protocol:
– Alice commits the values δi, rani with quantum-safe classical commitments.
– Alice sends all the s labelled quantum states and then the s commitments to Bob.
– Bob randomly chooses the index α and request to open all commitments for i 6= α.
– Alice reveals all the classical values δi, rani for i 6= α.
– Bob verifies that all the instructions are computed correctly and aborts otherwise.
– The remaining set of instructions δα is correct up to probability
1√
s
.
The receiver can use the remaining committed instructions δα to drive the computation by
asking the sender to open the instructions corresponding to the measurement outcomes (influence-
past). This differs from the classical case where the circuit evaluation is non-interactive.
3.3 Quantum Computation Cut-and-Choose (QC-CC)
We can now introduce a Cut-and-Choose technique for quantum computation. The sender can
deviate in any way. By combining CI-CC with QSP-CC and using the commitments during the
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(quantum) computation, the evaluator knows (with high probability) that they have been asked to
perform the correct quantum computation.
Protocol 6 Functionality: QC-CC
Set up: Two parties Alice and Bob, a (quantum) computation f hidden in the pairs (rani, δi).
Input: Alice inputs a set of s pure states {|ψ1(ran1)〉 , · · · , |ψs(rans)〉} and for each state a set of classical instructions
{δ1, · · · , δs}, the underlying randomness {ran1, · · · , rans} and the classical description of each state. Bob chooses
one index α at random.
Output: For any adversarial Alice, the probability of performing the wrong computation and not aborting is O
(
1√
s
)
.
Protocol:
– Alice commits the classical values ψi(rani) and δi, rani as in protocols 4 and 5 respectively.
– Alice sends all the s labelled quantum states and then the s commitments to Bob.
– Bob randomly chooses the index α and request to open all commitments for i 6= α.
– Alice reveals all the classical values ψi(rani), δi, rani for i 6= α.
– Bob performs the same verifications as in protocols 4 and 5 and aborts similarly.
– Alice reveals a subset of instructions δα, as required by the protocol they wish to perform (but keeps secret ranα).
– Bob uses these along with the state |ψα〉 to perform the desired computation.
From Protocol 4, the state |ψα(ranα)〉 is 1√s -close to the ideal state. From Protocol 5, the
pair (δα, ranα) are constructed correctly up to probability
1√
s
. It follows that the computation is
performed correctly up to probability O( 1√
s
).
Proof. We suppose that we have access to an oracle Of which, upon being given the secret pa-
rameters rani, ψi(rani) and a subset of the instructions δi which is sufficient to drive a single
specific computation on the resource state |ψi(rani)〉, returns the output fi produced by using
these instructions on the (correct) state |ψi(rani)〉.
Let us construct a simulator for an adversarial Alice:
1. The simulator runs the protocol normally until Alice reveals her commitments: receives the
qubits and commitments, chooses random index α and receives the openings of commitments
for i 6= α.
2. Using the special rewinding (Appendix C.2), it rewinds the simulation and chooses at random
a second index α′, (for known ranα′ , ψα′(ranα′), δα′).
This (classical) part of the protocol can be viewed as three steps: commitment (sending the
commitments), challenge (choosing the random α) and response (revealing the commitments).
Furthermore it has two properties: special soundness and strict soundness. Intuitively, special
soundness means that given two correct communication transcripts with different challenges, an
extractor is able to compute a witness (the simulator recovers the secret values). Strict soundness
means that given a commitment and challenge, there is a unique acceptable response: here the only
accepted response is to decommit the correct committed values (due to perfect and strict binding).
Following the analysis in [26], protocols possessing such properties are secure against malicious
quantum adversaries and can use rewinding against quantum adversaries in their security proof to
extract a witness, evading issues naive rewinding faces due to no-cloning. This rewinding can only
be done once as per the A-style definition of Σ-protocols in [26]. Lemma 1 shows that after this
step the distance between the real execution and the simulation is bounded by 1√
s
.
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Importantly, the clear separation between classical information and quantum states in protocols
based on [10] is what makes the rewinding possible on the classical part of the protocol.
3. The simulator performs all the checks for i 6= α′ and aborts in the same cases as an honest
party would.
4. Alice reveals a subset of δα′ needed to perform the computation.
5. The simulator can send this subset, along with the corresponding ranα′ , ψα′(ranα′) which were
acquired previously, to the oracle Of and recover the correct output fα′ , which is returned to
Alice at the end of the computation.
The distance between the ideal and real execution is bounded by O( 1√
s
). uunionsq
In addition to the arguments given in QSP-CC against using s/2 evaluation graphs with quan-
tum states, we give an attack against our protocol showing concretely why this is not applicable:
malicious P1 encodes a teleportation of P2’s input in the trap qubits of one graph. Since the results
of all measurements are given back, P1 can recover P2’s input if the corrupt graph is (one of the)
evaluated. This attack succeeds with probability number of evaluation graphss and so we cannot hope
for a better security bound than an inverse polynomial with this version of the protocol. Classi-
cally, evaluating an incorrect circuit has minimal influence when using s/2 evaluation circuits where
only the majority output is returned. Here guaranteeing that the majority of evaluation circuits
is correct would not be enough (the evaluation of a circuit gives extra information for the sake of
verifiability).
A final crucial observation is that this proof provides an example where proving security against
a quantum adversary is hard, even for a classical functionality (CC). The part of the protocol that
needs rewinding is entirely classical and the same proof (and extra cost) is necessary even for a
fully classical CC protocol (single evaluation graph). The failure probability goes from 1s to
1√
s
for quantum adversaries. This kind of quadratic gap is unavoidable against quantum adversaries,
unless (possibly) one uses totally different proof techniques: it is not sufficient to use cryptographic
primitives resistant against quantum computers (eg. based on LWE), but proof techniques (and
security parameters) should also be modified.
4 The 2PQC Protocol
Ideal functionality.
– Inputs: Each party has a classical input, x, y ∈ {0, 1}n for P1 and P2 respectively. The adversary
has auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}∗. Honest parties send their input to the trusted party computing
f = (f1, f2), a corrupted party i either sends aborti or any input of length n (computed in
poly-time from their input and auxiliary input).
– Computation by the trusted party: If the trusted party receives an inconsistent input or
aborti by any party i, it returns aborti to both parties. Otherwise the trusted party first sends
f1(x
′, y′) to P1 (x′ = x if P1 is honest, similarly for P2), who can then choose to abort if
corrupted (by sending abort1, which the trusted party forwards to P2). If not, then P2 receives
f2(x
′, y′) from the trusted party.
– Outputs: Honest parties output what they received from the trusted party, corrupted parties
have no output, the adversary outputs an arbitrary BQP function of their inputs and outputs.
We will use the security parameters s (number of graphs for CC) and n (size of the inputs)
throughout the paper. P1 and P2 will denote the garbler/client and the evaluator/server respectively.
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High-level overview P1 and P2 have already chosen a VBQC graph computing f = (f1, f2) fault-
tolerantly. P1 chooses and commits to the randomness for the s versions of the graph (the angles θ
of the states and the flips r in the measurements) and also to all the corresponding measurements
angles according to the flow, the possible input measurement angles for both parties, the decryption
keys for P2’s output also according to the flow and the positions of the traps among P2’s output
qubits. For every input bit of P2, they perform a 1-out-of-2 OT at the end of which P2 learns
the measurement angles for their input qubits for all graphs (doing the OTs before sending the
qubits is essential for the security proof, it allows the simulator to recover the adversary’s input
before constructing the graphs). They then perform a QC-CC protocol: the qubits of each graph
are the states |ψi(rani)〉, the commitments are rani, ψi(rani) and δi, they choose the evaluation
graph with a coin-tossing protocol, P1 reveals the commitments of check circuits and P2 verifies
them as well as the states. Then they perform the evaluation with the VUBQC protocol with P1
decommitting to the instructions (measurement angles). At the end they perform a simple key-
exchange protocol so that P2 may decrypt their output.
Theorem 2 (Correctness). If both parties are honest and follow the steps of the protocol then
the protocol is correct.
Proof. If the parties are honest, all the graphs and commitments are correct. The protocol (re-
stricted to the evaluation graph) is equivalent to the normal VBQC, with the evaluator (P2) keeping
part of the output. The last step of the protocol allows P2 to decrypt this output just the same
way as the P1 would in a regular execution. Moreover, all the checks pass and there is no abort.
The correctness directly follows from the correctness of the VBQC protocol. uunionsq
Theorem 3. Assume that the oblivious transfer protocol is 2-private against malicious adversaries
and that the commitments are perfectly hiding and binding. Let c be the maximum degree of the
graph, δ the number of errors tolerated by the fault-tolerant encoding and s the number of graphs
constructed as part of the CC. If the protocol is 2-verifiable for P1, then it is 2-private against a
malicious P2 and 1-private against a covert P1, where 2 =
(
8
9
)d
for d =
⌈
δ
2(2c+1)
⌉
and 1 =
1√
s
Proof Sketch. The proof follows from Lemma 3 (1-privacy against a covert P1) and Lemma 5
(2-privacy against a malicious P2) (see detailed proof in Appendix D).
The simulator for adversarial P1 (Lemma 3) is very similar to the one in the proof for Protocol
3.3: obtains one set of values form a first run (runs as usual until P1 reveals the commitments)
then rewinds the adversary to get a second set and recovers the secret parameters of the adversary
which then sends to the ideal functionality, thus getting the ideal output. The simulator runs the
evaluation graph with a random input, encrypts the ideal output and returns it to the adversary.
The simulator for adversarial P2 (Lemma 5) relies on the construction of a graph which has
deterministic output (see Lemma 4). The simulator recovers the adversary’s input with the OTs
and sends it to the ideal functionality, from which P2’s ideal output is obtained. Then constructs
a graph which always produces this output and hides it among the remaining s− 1 graphs, which
are constructed correctly. The simulator biases the choice of evaluation graph with rewinding the
coin-toss so that this special graph is chosen. The checks pass and P2 evaluates the fake graph and
gets the correct output. uunionsq
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Protocol 7 Secure 2PQC - QYao Cut-and-Choose protocol
Input: P1 has input x ∈ {0, 1}n and P2 has input y ∈ {0, 1}n.
Auxiliary input: Functions f1 and f2, a security parameter s (which is a power of 2) and the description of a
fault-tolerant MBQC pattern C such that C(x, y) = (f1(x, y), f2(x, y)) for classical inputs (x, y).
Output: Party P1 should receive f1(x, y) and party P2 should receive f2(x, y).
The protocol:
1. P1 constructs s copies of the dotted-triple-graph computing C using independent randomness (here they just
choose everything in the different graphs, no need to prepare the qubits just yet).
2. P1 constructs commitments to:
(a) All θji,q, r
j
i,q (these correspond to the rani, while the θ
j
i,q alone correspond to |ψi(rani〉in the QC-CC protocol,
all the other commitments correspond to δi),
kδji,q where i runs over all s graphs, q is the index of the base
location in the graph, j correspond to the index of computation, trap and dummy qubits for this particular
base location (in the order they appear in the triple-dotted-graph i, so if the first qubit for this base location
is a trap, θ1i,q will be the angle associated with that trap) for this base location q and k runs over all possible
correction values (previous measurements) affecting this position, according to the flow (the position of the
traps and dummies in all graphs are given implicitly through these values). They also commit to the values
of the dummy qubits.
(b) For their and P2’s input they commit to both possible versions of bδ
j
i,q where b ∈ {0, 1}, in permuted order
for their input and in correct order for P2’s input.
(c) They commit to all potential keys (a One-Time-Pad) for each of P2’s output qubits (according to flow).
(d) They commit to the positions of the computation qubits, dummies and traps in the last layer of computation
for P2’s output qubits.
3. P1 and P2 participate in n instances of a 1-out-of-2 OT protocol, where in each one P1’s inputs are the sets of{
decommit(0δ
j
i,q)
}
0≤i≤s−1 and
{
decommit(1δ
j
i,q)
}
0≤i≤s−1 and P2’s input is bit bq corresponding to position q.
In the end of step 3, P2 receives the decommitments to the measurement angles corresponding to all their inputs
(for the same binary value across all graphs).
4. P1 and P2 perform the QC-CC protocol (6):
(a) P1 sends the qubits in the states |+θji,q 〉
(b) Then P1 sends the commitments
(c) They both pick the random graph index α using the coin-tossing Protocol 3
(d) P1 opens the commitments from 2.(a), 2.(b), 2.(c), 2.(d) for any graph whose index is not α
(e) P2 performs checks and outputs abort2 and halts if any of the checks fail (the checks are the following : the
δs are correctly constructed and are compatible with the choice of φ, r and θ; the traps and dummies are
in the correct place (from commitments 2.(a) and 2.(d)); the decryption keys are correct; the values they
received for their input via the OTs are consistent (they are in the correct place with regard to their input
bit); they verify that all |+
θ
j
i,q
〉 are correct by measuring them in the θji,q basis).
(f) Then P1 opens the values from commitments to the δs in 2.(b) corresponding to their actual binary input
for graph α. P2 entangles the qubits according to the dotted-triple-graph and evaluates this graph by asking
P1 to open the values to
kδji,q in 2.(a) for k corresponding to the measurements values they obtained on each
qubit. If any of the traps are measured incorrectly P1 privately raises a flag corrupted. This corresponds to
the evaluation phase of Protocol 1.
5. At the end of the computation they perform the following key-release step:
(a) P2 measures all the qubits in the final layer (output qubits) according to the corresponding
kδji,q, as decom-
mitted by P1.
(b) They send back all the measurement outcomes corresponding to P1’s output qubits and commit to the ones
corresponding to their output qubits.
(c) P1 checks all the traps on their qubits and outputs abort1 if any fail or if the flag corrupted was raised during
computation, otherwise they decrypt their output using their decryption keys and set the decryption as their
output. (Continues on next page)
(d) P1 reveals the positions of traps and dummies in the final layer of the computation by decommitting 2.(d)
(e) For these positions P2 reveals the commitments of 5.(b)
(f) P1 checks that these traps were measured correctly and outputs abort1 if any fail, otherwise they decommit
the decryption keys in 2.(c) corresponding to P2’s output.
(g) P2 decrypts their output, sets the decryption as their final output and ends the protocol.
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A Mapping of a universal set of gate in the MBQC framework
We present here diagrams taken from [4] showing how to translate a universal set of gates to the
MBQC model using the brickwork graphs.
Fig. 2. Translation of H, pi/8, CNOT and identity gates
B Proof of QSP-CC
We have two CP-maps, one corresponding to the real protocol and one to the simulation, and need
to show that these maps are -close.
We define P0 := I ⊗Ni=1 [ψi] and Pj := I
⊗
i 6=j
[ψi]⊗ Ij for all 1 ≤ j ≤ s. It is clear that PjPk = P0
if j 6= k and [Pj , Pk] = 0. Moreover we define Pj = P0 + P cj and can easily see that P cj P ck = δj,kP cj .
Also we define p2 = Tr(P0ρ) and p1 =
1
s
∑
i
Tr(Piρ) ≤ p2 + 1s (1 − p2). We have the following two
CPTP maps:
Φ1(ρ) =
1
s
s∑
i=1
PiρPi + (1− p1)[Abort]
Φ2(ρ) = P0ρP0 + (1− p2)[Abort]
Proof. The real protocol corresponds to Bob acting on some state ρ sent by Alice, by applying the
CPTP map Φ1(·), i.e. measuring if the states sent are correct by choosing randomly one state to be
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left unmeasured. We will show that it is -close to Φ2(·) map resulting to ρid(p). Let a purification
of ρ be |ψ〉, we need to show:
∆(P0 |ψ〉〈ψ|P0, 1
s
∑
i
Pi |ψ〉〈ψ| 〈ψ|Pi) ≤ 
We use the sub-normalised fidelity and its relation with the trace distance. We will use the following
properties and definitions from [7]:
∆˜(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F˜ 2(ρ, σ)
F˜ (ρ, σ) = F (ρ, σ) +
√
(1− Tr ρ)(1− Trσ)
F 2(|φ〉 , σ) = 〈φ|σ|φ〉
Let σ1 =
1
s
∑
i
Pi |ψ〉〈ψ|Pi, σ2 = P0 |ψ〉〈ψ|P0, p2 = Trσ2 and p1 = Trσ1 ≤ p2 + 1s (1 − p2). It is
straightforward to see that F (σ1, σ2) = p2. We obtain:
F˜ (σ1, σ2) ≥ p2 +
√
(1− p2)(1− p2 − 1
s
(1− p2)) ≈ p2 + (1− p2)(1− 1
2s
) ≥ 1− 1
2s
assuming s 1. It follows that:
∆˜(σ1, σ2) ≤
√
1− (1− 1
2s
)2 ≈
√
1
s
We have Φ1(ρ) = σ1 + (1 − p1)[Abort] and Φ2(ρ) = σ2 + (1 − p2)[Abort] and using the above
expressions we get:
∆(Φ1(ρ), Φ2(ρ)) ≤
√
1
s
By tracing out all but the unmeasured system α, Bob has (in the simulated case) a state 1√
s
-close
to ρid(p2) = p2[ψc] + (1− p2)[Abort]. uunionsq
C Quantum Rewinding
Classically the simulator runs the adversary (chooses its input x, z, r) internally and rewinds it
by having black box access to the next message function mi+1 = V (x, z, r,m1, . . . ,mi) where
m1, . . . ,mi are previous messages. The simulator has to save all messages so that it can send
them again later, which is impossible in the quantum setting (due to no-cloning). We present two
techniques given in [27] and [26] which achieve a similar result, with different constraints, show
that they are applicable for the simulators of our protocol and calculate the success probability for
both cases.
C.1 Watrous’ Oblivious Quantum Rewinding
Let Q be a unitary acting on the pure state |ψ〉 ∣∣0k〉. We first apply Q to |ψ〉 ∣∣0k〉 and then measure
the first qubit in the computational basis. Let p(ψ) ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that this measurement
outcome is 0. Then there are unique unit vectors |φ0(ψ)〉 and |φ1(ψ)〉 such that:
Q |ψ〉
∣∣∣0k〉 = √p(ψ) |0〉 |φ0(ψ)〉+√1− p(ψ) |1〉 |φ1(ψ)〉 (5)
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Lemma 8 from [27] gives a procedure constructing from Q outputting a state close to |φ0(ψ)〉 for
any |ψ〉.
Q represents an attempt at simulating for some cheating adversary, |ψ〉 is the internal state of
this adversary. Getting 0 means the simulation was successful and getting 1 corresponds to failure
and necessity to rewind. Lemma 8 from [27] states that this is possible if p(ψ) is non-negligible
and independent of ψ. Rewinding gives a state -close to that of a successful simulation for any
exponentially small  with polynomially many rewinds.
In our case the rewinding takes place during the coin-tossing part of simulation for P2. Let αˆ
be the random evaluation graph index chosen by the simulator at the beginning of the proof. After
the coin-tossing phase of the protocol, before verifying if the simulation has succeeded or not, the
state of the system is in product form (i.e. the random choices of α, αˆ, are depicted as an equal
superposition, but are totally uncorrelated):
|Φf 〉 :=
(
s∑
α=1
cα |φ(ψ, α)〉 |α〉
)(
s∑
αˆ=1
1√
s
|αˆ〉
)
where
∑
α
|cα|2 = 1 are coefficients, |φ(ψ, α)〉 is the (normalised) state at the end of the protocol
given initial state ψ and choice of graph α, while the last part (|αˆ〉) corresponds to the random
choice of graph made by the simulator. The projection to the subspace that does not need rewinding
(where α = αˆ) is given: P0 :=
s∑
α′=1
I ⊗ |α′〉〈α′| ⊗ |α′〉〈α′|. We have:
|Φf 〉 = P0 |Φf 〉+ (I − P0) |Φf 〉
To bring it in the form of Eq.(5) we rewrite it. We define the (normalised) states:
|φ0(ψ)〉 =
s∑
α=1
cα |φ(ψ, α)〉 |α〉 |α〉 ; |φ1(ψ)〉 =
s∑
α=1
∑
α 6=αˆ
cα√
s−1 |φ(ψ, α)〉 |α〉 |αˆ〉
Then we have:
|Φf 〉 =
√
1
s
|φ0(ψ)〉+
√
1− 1
s
|φ1(ψ)〉
Now, following the unitary action that led to |Φf 〉, we perform the measurement {P0, I − P0} and
store the outcome in the value of an extra qubit (the first one):
|Φf 〉 =
√
1
s
|0〉 |φ0(ψ)〉+
√
1− 1
s
|1〉 |φ1(ψ)〉
Finally, we note that this is exactly in the form of Eq. (5) where p(ψ) = 1s is constant (independent
of ψ). Further details in [27], proof of Lemma 8.
C.2 Unruh’s Special Quantum Rewinding
Watrous’ lemma only ensures that the simulation is successful, but no information is kept between
two rewinds (hence oblivious rewinding). In the simulator for covert P1 we need two transcripts in
order to recover their input (which is otherwise secret), so another type of rewinding is necessary.
We present the conditions under which Unruh’s rewinding method [26] applies and then show that
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these conditions are met in our protocol and calculate an upper bound on the distance between the
actual and simulated (rewinding to extract input) runs.
Let Π be a protocol between P1, with input (x,w), and P2, with input x and output in {0, 1},
with three messages: commitment com by P1, challenge ch sampled (efficiently) uniformly at random
by P2 from the set Cx (membership in Cx has to be easy to decide), and response resp by P1. P2
accepts (outputs 0) by a deterministic poly-time computation on (x, com, ch, resp) (it is called an
accepting conversation for x).
Definition 7 (Special soundness). Such a protocol has special soundness if there is a determin-
istic poly-time algorithm K0 (the special extractor) such that for any two accepting conversations
(com, ch, resp) and (com, ch′, resp′) for x with ch 6= ch′, we have that w := K0(x, com, ch, resp, ch′, resp′).
Definition 8 (Strict soundness). Such a protocol has strict soundness if for any two accepting
conversations (com, ch, resp); (com, ch, resp′) for x, resp = resp′.
Canonical extractor ([26]) The extractor runs the first step of the adversary to recover com (each
step is a separate unitary operation), chooses two values ch, ch′ ∈ Cx, runs the second step with
ch to get resp, applies the inverse of the second step (this is the rewinding) and reruns the second
step with ch′ to get resp′ before applying K0. Since each response is uniquely determined by the
commitment and the challenge, if the measured response of the adversary is correct then they must
have sent a state close to the real response, therefore this does not disturb too much the internal
state of the adversary.
In our case, com corresponds to step 5 (sending commitments), ch is step 6 (result of coin-toss)
and resp is step 7 (revealing commitments). We calculate the distance between the internal state
of the adversary in the real protocol where only the commitments for the check graphs are opened
and the one after the rewinding in the simulation where all commitments have been opened.
We consider the opening of the commitments as a measurement performed on a state shared
with the adversary. Let Pi denote the projector corresponding to one run of this part of the protocol
where the challenge is i (analogous to the P ∗ch in [26]). This corresponds to revealing all commitments
but one, corresponding to the graph of index i. We define P¯i = 1l−Pi. There is a “correct” subspace
P , that projects to the subspace that answer all s tests, i.e. PPi := P for all i.
The strict soundness property means that there is a unique classical response to each challenge.
This intuitively means that two projection Pi and Pj acting on the same subsystem, are either
identity or identical which essentially means that they commute, i.e. PiPj = PjPi. On the other
hand, the property of special soundness means that any two of these tests, when both successful,
allow the simulator to recover a witness. This means that PiPj = P for all i 6= j.
Lemma 1. Let |ψ〉 be any state and let {Pi}0≤i≤s and P be as defined above. For  = 1s we have
that:
max
|ψ〉
∆
(
P |ψ〉 , 1
s
∑
i
Pi |ψ〉〈ψ|Pi
)
≤ √
Proof. The proof follows the one above for QSP-CC. We again use the sub-normalised fidelity. Let
ρ = P |ψ〉〈ψ|P and σ = 1s
∑
i
Pi |ψ〉〈ψ|Pi. We further define Pi = P +P ci and p = 〈ψ|P |ψ〉. It follows
directly from special soundness that P ci P
c
j = δi,jP
c
i . Since P
c
i , P
c
j , P are orthogonal and the sum of
the traces (probabilities) of the P ci -terms cannot exceed (1− p), we then have that:
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Trσ := Tr
(
1
s
∑
i
Pi |ψ〉〈ψ|Pi
)
=
1
s
∑
i
〈ψ|(P + P ci )|ψ〉 = p+
1
s
∑
i
〈ψ|P ci |ψ〉 ≤ p+
1
s
(1− p)
F 2
(
P |ψ〉〈ψ|P, 1s
∑
i
Pi |ψ〉〈ψ|Pi
)
= p2
Assuming  = 1s where s 1, with simple calculation we obtain:
F˜ (ρ, σ) ≥ 1− 
2
⇒ ∆˜(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− (1− 
2
)2 ≈ √
This result is independent of |ψ〉 (and p) and thus completes the proof. uunionsq
We have Φ1(·)
√
≈ Φ2(·) where Φ1(·) is the CP-map corresponding to the projection in the P
subspace, while Φ2(·) is the CP-map corresponding to the real protocol operation (project in one
of Pi subspace, randomly chosen from the s possible challenges). The simulated view is
√
-close to
the real protocol. Given this measurement, the simulator, (a) if it accepts (measurement result P )
the state is close to the real protocol, (b) if it rejects, it is identical with the real protocol (since
for abort, the exact state of the parties is irrelevant).
D Proof of Security
All the following proofs will be carried out in the OT-hybrid model. This means that parties can
at the same time communicate with one another but also rely in certain steps of the protocol on
an ideal call to a trusted party (also called oracle) performing an oblivious transfer. During the
simulation, the simulator replaces this trusted party and receives all inputs that the adversary
sends to it. We make this assumption only in order to make the proof clearer and easier, in a real
protocol this ideal functionality can then be replaced with any OT protocol which is secure against
malicious quantum adversaries.
We start by proving the -verifiability for the client.
Lemma 2 (-verifiability for the client). Protocol 7 is 2-verifiable for P1, where 2 =
(
8
9
)d
for
d =
⌈
δ
2(2c+1)
⌉
.
Proof. In this proof we consider that P1 is honest while P2 is malicious. During the first steps of
the protocol, P2 only participates in the perfectly secure OT at the end of which they receives their
input measurement angles, based on their choice of deviated input xˆ.
P2 then receives the qubits of all the graphs and the commitments. These are perfectly hiding
so no information can be recovered from them until P1 decides to send the decommitment values.
Furthermore, deviating at this point on the qubits is equivalent to deviating later.
Because the coin-tossing protocol used is proven secure (the same rewinding techniques as the
ones used in the proofs for P1 and P2 can be used), a malicious P2 cannot bias the result. After the
result of the coin-toss is known, P2 receives the decommitments for all graphs but the evaluation
graph, about which they therefore remain blind.
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The evaluation part of the protocol follows exactly the same pattern as the VUBQC protocol
in [17], with the difference that instead of announcing the angles of the measurements, P1 sends
the corresponding decommitments, which in the case of an honest P1 is perfectly equivalent. This
protocol has been proven to be 2-verifiable for P1 in [17], see Theorem 1.
After the computation P2 measures the output qubits and has to commit to the result of the
measurements, of which they have to reveal the traps. P1 can therefore verify that all the traps were
measured correctly. The only last deviation the server is allowed to perform is a further computation
on their binary output, which is by definition allowed even in the ideal case.
From this analysis it follows that the exact same verification properties from the protocol in
[17] hold for this protocol, namely that our protocol is 2-verifiable for P1, where 2 =
(
8
9
)d
for
d =
⌈
δ
2(2c+1)
⌉
, which completes the proof. uunionsq
The honest behaviour of P2 is essentially enforced by the traps (verifiability), while the Cut-
and-Choose technique enforces P1 to also behave honestly.
D.1 Security Against Covert P1
Intuition The proof is an adapted version of Lindell and Pinkas proof for malicious P1 [20] and
the proof for covert adversaries of [1]. The intuition is that if they choose to cheat by constructing
incorrectly the graphs or the OTs then they will get caught with probability at least 1 during the
opening phase of the protocol, whereas if they do construct the graphs and OTs correctly then
they acts the same as an honest party would. The simulator runs the protocol normally until the
opening of the commitments by P1. Then, since the coin toss is random even with malicious P1,
the simulator does quantum rewinding (see [26]) and learn the rest of the commitments. When
the malicious P1 reveals their input measurement angles, having obtained the related randomness
the simulator can deduce P1’s bit-input and send it to the ideal functionality. It then runs the
evaluation graph with random input and returns the output received from the ideal functionality
(note that the correct decoding key is known to the simulator from the rewinding).
Lemma 3. Protocol 7 is 1-private against a covert P1, where 1 =
1√
s
Proof. Let us construct the simulator in the following way:
1. The simulator runs the protocol normally until step 3 : participates in the OTs, with a random
input y′ instead of P2’s actual input.
2. Then acts as the simulator in Protocol 6: receives the qubits and commitments, participates in
the coin-tossing protocol, receives the openings, rewinds, performs the coin-tossing again and
receives the other set of openings, performs all the verifications and aborts as an honest party
would.
3. The adversary decommits the value of their input angles for the new evaluation graph, the
simulator deduces P1’s binary deviated input xˆ from the knowledge of secret parameters and
sends it to the ideal functionality. It gets in return the output value f1(xˆ, y) for this deviated
input.
4. Then performs the computation on graph α′ using a random input y′. At the end of the com-
putation replaces the bits of the computation positions for P1’s output with the bits received
from the ideal functionality (after correcting them using the decryption keys known due to the
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rewinding) and returns this to the adversary, while committing to what it computed as P2’s
output. When P1 reveals the positions of the traps and dummies in the last layer, the simulator
verifies that they were traps as an honest P2 and opens the corresponding positions. Receives
the keys from the adversary, and outputs whatever the adversary would and halts.
The fact that the simulation is the same up to a negligible factor whether we use a random index
chosen by P2 or a coin-tossing protocol can be formalised in terms of a series of games, involving
an ideal functionality for coin-tossing (such an ideal functionality takes as input a dummy input λ
from P2 and returns to both players the same random string α):
Game 1. Here the simulator runs the protocol as usual, with no rewinding.
Game 2. We replace the protocol for coin-tossing with the ideal functionality. Because the protocol
for coin-tossing is secure against malicious quantum adversaries, the distance between the first game
and the second is negligible.
Game 3. Here the simulator sends directly to covert P1 a challenge chosen at random instead of
calling the ideal functionality for coin-tossing. This is equivalent to the setup (com, ch, resp) for
[26]. This is indistinguishable from the previous game from the point of view of the adversary.
Game 4. Now we use quantum rewinding so the simulator sends two challenges to P1, this is
equivalent to the rewinding performed in [26]. According to the analysis performed in Lemma 1,
here the distance is 1√
s
.
Game 5. We perform the switch the other way : we replace the simulator sending the random chal-
lenges by two calls to the ideal functionality (there is no problem with calling this ideal functionality
twice as the input is a dummy input). This is once more indistinguishable for the adversary.
Game 6. Again we switch back : the ideal functionality calls are replaced by the real coin-tossing
protocol. The distance is also negligible and this game represents exactly what happens during our
simulation.
The result of this game-based analysis is that the distance between the real execution of the
protocol and the simulation the way we perform it for this step is bounded by 1√
s
, up to a negligible
quantity.
Following the analysis in Appendix C.2 and Lemma 1, we get that after the rewinding we have
(with (xˆ, y) being the input after the adversary’s deviation, equivalent to the ρ′in from the definition
of verifiability):
∆
(
vi(P˜1, xˆ),TrP2,i
(
ρ˜(A˜, xˆ)
))
≤ 1√
s
The state at the end of the simulation is 1 =
1√
s
-close to the real execution. uunionsq
D.2 Security Against Malicious P2
We first prove a lemma, showing how to construct a graph evaluating to a given fixed output for
any input in a way indistinguishable from a regular computation producing that output for a given
(possibly different) input.
Lemma 4. Given the value f2(x, yˆ), there exist a dotted-triple graph, along with commitments
identical to the evaluation graph, which when evaluated for any classical input x′ and y′ returns the
fixed output f2(x, yˆ) and is indistinguishable for the evaluator (even when given the decommitments
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for the evaluation graph in Protocol 7) from a DT(G) computing (f1(x, y), f2(x, y)) for any x and
y.
Proof. The graph is constructed as such:
– P1 chooses all the parameters (θ
j
q, rq,
kδjq, and bδ
j
i,q for inputs) at random for all the base-location
qubits apart from those corresponding to P2’s output.
– For those base locations q, for the computation qubits j, P1 chooses at random θ
j
q and bq ∈ {0, 1}
and sets kδjq = θ
j
q + bqpi for all choices of k. P1 then sets the corresponding decryption keys to
kkq = f2(x, yˆ)q ⊕ bq for all choices of k.
– Then P1 prepares all qubits in the correct state for the base locations but instead of sending
the correct ones for the added qubits for the edges linking P2’s outputs qubits to the rest of
the graph, P1 sends dummy qubits (in states chosen from {|0〉 , |1〉}). This will have the effect
of breaking away these qubits from the rest of the graph.
Since the dummies isolate the output of P2 from the rest of the graph, P2 obtains the result bq
when measuring the last layer whatever the previous measurement outcomes are. Thus applying the
decryption keys receives f2(x, yˆ). The indistinguishability follows directly from the servers blindness
in the VBQC protocol and the hiding property of the bit commitment scheme: since the random
θjqs are not revealed at any point server cannot get any information from the decommitments if
done as in the evaluation graph in Protocol 7. uunionsq
Intuition. The following proof combines the proofs for a malicious P2 from [20] and [1]. The sim-
ulator first extracts P2’s deviated input yˆ (once again (x, yˆ) plays the same role as the ρ
′
in in the
verifiability definition) from the OT-protocols, which it then uses to call the ideal functionality
and receive f2(x, yˆ). Then it chooses at random one graph index for which it will construct the
associated graph such that it computes always this value as P2’s output (as in Lemma 4). Then
uses the rewinding technique from [27] to bias the coin-toss so this index is picked as the evaluation
graph. The other graphs are constructed correctly and all checks pass. Then for the evaluation it
follows the same steps as in original protocol, guaranteeing that P2 will receive f2(x, yˆ) at the end
because the computation over a single graph is verifiable and secure against a malicious P2. While
the property of 2-verifiability for P1 guarantees that the protocol is close to the ideal, the previous
lemma gives the construction of a simulator of this ideal execution. Here we justify the coin tossing
protocol, since if P2 chose the evaluation graph we would be unable to obtain the simulator for P2.
Lemma 5. If Protocol 7 is 2-verifiable for the client, then it is 2-private against a malicious
server.
Proof. Let us construct the simulator in the following way:
1. The simulator chooses at random the values of bδ
j
i,q for P2’s input and organizes these values
in 2n sets of length s:
{
0δ
j
i,q
}
0≤i≤s−1
and
{
1δ
j
i,q
}
0≤i≤s−1
for all qubits q corresponding to P2’s
input.
2. Then invokes the adversary and receives from them what it would have sent to the trusted party
computing the OT: yˆ = (yˆ1, . . . , yˆm) which is the actual input that the adversary intended to
use. The simulator returns the corresponding sets of inputs. Here the simulated and real state
are identical.
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3. The simulator calls the ideal functionality and receives the value f2(x, yˆ). Chooses the index of
the evaluation graph α and for all the check graphs constructs them normally (only now the
values of θji,q and r
j
i,q are determined by bδ
j
i,q and φb) and for the evaluation constructs it as in
the proof of Lemma 4. Commits to all those values as it would in the real protocol, in the same
order, as well as the decryption keys from Lemma 4. The simulator sends the qubits and gives
all these commitments to P2. The ideal and real situations are again indistinguishable as shown
in Lemma 4.
4. The simulator needs to “bias” the coin toss to outputs the α chosen:
– It first generates a perfectly binding commitment cˆ to a random value α1 and sends it to
the adversary.
– Then receives α2 from the adversary.
– If α1 ⊕ α2 = α, the simulator continues by decommiting α1. Otherwise rewinds back to the
beginning of this step, with fresh randomness and a new value for α1.
It should be noted that no information is kept between rewinds as it is only used to ensure that
the adversary is forced to pick our fake graph as the evaluation graph. The probability of success
of the rewinding is 1s , which is independent of the initial state of the adversary. We can therefore
use the oblivious quantum rewind technique from [27] for this step of simulation. At this point
〈φ0(ψ)|ρ(ψ)|φ0(ψ)〉 ≥ 1 − , where |ψ〉 is the state of the adversary before this step, |φ0(ψ)〉
corresponds to the state after a success happening in one try while ρ(ψ) is the state at the end
of the rewinding process. The expected number of rewinds is O
(
s2
s−1 log
1

)
. Here we want an 
negligible in n, so log 1 = O(n) is sufficient and we get O(ns) rewinds. More details can be found
in Appendix C.1.
5. The simulator opens all commitments as in the protocol for the checks. These correspond to
the correct graphs and thus all pass. Nothing is leaked about the evaluation graph and so the
ideal and real states are indistinguishable.
6. The simulator then runs the remaining graph and runs the computation until the end of the
protocol on the modified evaluation graph as P1. In the end, outputs whatever the adversary
outputs and halts.
Let kP2 be the key committed as the decryption key for P2’s output as part of the fake graph con-
struction in Lemma 4. At the end of the computation, P2 is in possession of the state TrHP1 (EkP2 (f(x, yˆ))) =
EkP2 (f2(x, yˆ)), where EkP2 (z) denotes the encryption as a quantum state of the classical value z
under the key kP2 (this key is the one chosen as part of the construction of the fake graph in the
previous lemma). At the end of the computation the simulator reveals the key by decommitting it
and P2 can decrypt their outcome. The server’s view of the real protocol after receiving the key is:
TrHP1
(
EkP2
(
ρ˜n−1(P˜2, yˆ)
))
From Eq. (3) (noting that partial trace is a distance non-increasing operation):
∆
(
TrHP1
(
EkP2
(
ρ˜n−1(P˜2, yˆ)
))
,TrHP1
(
EkP2 (ρ
n−1
ideal(yˆ))
)) ≤ 1
We showed that the simulated view is 2-close to the real view of P2. uunionsq
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